Introduction
In the era of total surveillance—where spying no longer involves trench coats and binoculars but algorithms, metadata, and neural networks—state intelligence has ceased to be a resource exclusive to superpowers. In this context, Mexico’s National Intelligence Center (CNI) emerges as a silent yet operationally vital institution, with a profile that raises questions both domestically and internationally. What was once the CISEN, accused of spying on journalists and political opponents, is now reborn as the CNI: an agency aspiring to become the central node of Mexico’s national security apparatus, while the rest of the world watches with skepticism and caution.
Origins and Transformation: From CISEN to CNI
To understand the CNI’s present, one must examine its immediate past. The Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN) was founded in 1989, succeeding the Federal Security Directorate, an agency implicated in human rights violations during Mexico’s so-called “Dirty War.” Its transformation into the current CNI occurred in December 2018, as part of the institutional overhaul promoted by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who promised to end political espionage (Ortega, 2021).
Although announced as a break with the past, most of the structure, operational personnel, and methodologies were inherited. The fundamental difference lies in its transfer from the Ministry of the Interior to the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection (SSPC). Notably, the appointment of retired general Audomaro Martínez Zapata—an ally of the president—as the first head of the CNI, was interpreted by analysts as a veiled militarization of civil intelligence (González, 2019).
Current Functions and Operational Scope
Today, the CNI’s mission is to generate strategic and operational intelligence to safeguard national security. Among its official tasks are the prevention of threats to state stability, protection of classified information, and coordination of the National Intelligence System (SSPC, 2024).
However, its responsibilities go beyond classical intelligence. In practice, the CNI has been involved in operations against criminal cells, digital surveillance, cyber intelligence, and geopolitical analysis. Recently, it increased its operational personnel by 10%, under the leadership of Francisco Almazán Barocio and the political backing of Omar García Harfuch (Infobae, 2024).
International Perception and Global Comparison
When analyzed within an international context, the CNI reveals both strengths and shortcomings. Unlike the U.S. CIA, Israel’s Mossad, or Russia’s FSB, the CNI lacks extraterritorial reach and offensive cyber capabilities. One of its key weaknesses lies in the lack of transparency and legislative oversight, which undermines its democratic legitimacy compared to its Western counterparts (Freedom House, 2023).
While some experts acknowledge that the CNI has modernized its surveillance and risk assessment capabilities, others warn that its operations remain overly focused on internal security and political control. This narrows its role in more complex geopolitical arenas such as transnational drug trafficking or Chinese and Russian tech espionage (González, 2024).
Risks, Tensions, and Reconfiguration
In this dynamic of power restructuring, the CNI’s consolidation as the central intelligence arm has generated friction with the Armed Forces. The Army and Navy, which traditionally operated with high autonomy in intelligence matters, now view SSPC’s growing interference with suspicion. Proposed reforms by President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum to centralize national security strategy under the SSPC have only deepened these tensions (El País, 2024).
Moreover, civil organizations and NGOs have warned that the CNI could engage in mass surveillance without judicial oversight, exploiting legal loopholes and budgetary opacity. Its reduced 2025 budget—from 2.984 to 2.759 billion pesos—may decrease technical capabilities but not necessarily operational ambitions (SSPC, 2025).
Artificial Intelligence, Cybersecurity, and the Future of the CNI
Clearly, in the 21st century, intelligence is no longer limited to human infiltration or physical surveillance. Power now resides in algorithms, metadata, and the ability to anticipate behavior through artificial intelligence (AI). Unsurprisingly, the world’s top agencies—such as the NSA, the UK’s GCHQ (GCHQ, 2023), and the Mossad—are already using predictive models, deep learning, and massive surveillance tools to preempt threats. In their book The Fifth Domain, Clarke and Knake (2019) warn that nations that fail to invest in cyber intelligence are doomed to systemic vulnerability.
By contrast, the CNI is only beginning its path toward intelligent digitalization. The lack of robust infrastructure, dependence on foreign technology, and scarcity of cyber intelligence experts put Mexico in a vulnerable position against cyberattacks from state actors or cartels with access to military-grade tech.
Even more concerning is the absence of legal frameworks regulating AI in surveillance practices. Without clear norms, the CNI could repeat the mistakes seen in other countries, where software like Pegasus was used to spy on journalists, activists, and opposition leaders.
Thus, the CNI’s real challenge is not only technological adaptation but doing so without sacrificing democratic safeguards or replicating the errors of its shadowy past.
Epilogue: The Invisible Power That Watches Us All
Today, the CNI operates in the shadows of a state increasingly leaning toward internal control and covert surveillance. Its transformation from CISEN into a supposedly renewed entity has been riddled with institutional silence, opaque alliances, and undefined objectives before public scrutiny. In a world where wars are fought with information and algorithms define the enemy, the CNI plays a dangerous game: that of watching without being watched.
As long as opacity, political dependency, and limited international projection persist, it will remain an intelligence body that, though silently spying, also becomes invisible to the very interests it should protect. This is not just a technical or institutional problem—it is a direct threat to Mexico’s public life. Without effective checks and balances, business leaders, scholars, journalists, NGOs, and everyday citizens could become targets of unchecked surveillance, undermining the right to dissent, to investigate, and to participate actively in democracy.
Ultimately, in a time when truth is also manufactured in data centers, the greatest risk is not being spied on—but not even knowing it’s happening.
References
Clarke, R. A., & Knake, R. K. (2019). The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats. Penguin Press.
GCHQ. (2023). Annual Report on National Security and Emerging Threats. Government Communications Headquarters, UK. Retrieved from https://www.gchq.gov.uk
González, J. (2024). México y su rezago en ciberinteligencia frente a las potencias. Animal Político. Retrieved from https://www.animalpolitico.com
El País. (2024, November 22). El Congreso aprueba los superpoderes para la Secretaría de Seguridad de Harfuch. Retrieved from https://elpais.com/mexico
Freedom House. (2023). Freedom in the World 2023: Mexico. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org
González, R. (2019). Militarización de la inteligencia en México. Revista Nexos. Retrieved from https://nexos.com.mx
Infobae. (2024, July 12). Así opera el Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), la costosa agencia de investigación que encabezará García Harfuch. Retrieved from https://www.infobae.com/mexico
Ortega, A. (2021). CISEN: historia de un aparato de espionaje. Proceso. Retrieved from https://www.proceso.com.mx
Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana (SSPC). (2024). Funciones del CNI. Retrieved from https://seguridad.sspc.gob.mx
Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana (SSPC). (2025). Presupuesto 2025 del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia. Retrieved from https://seguridad.sspc.gob.mx