Phoenix 24
Aviation has become another front in the long war of economic endurance.
Moscow, Russia
Russia has asked Vietnam to provide passenger aircraft under wet-lease agreements that would include crews, maintenance and insurance, as Western sanctions continue to weaken the country’s commercial aviation capacity. Nearly one fifth of the aircraft operated by Russia’s 11 largest airlines are currently out of service, well above normal grounding levels. Moscow is therefore searching for external partners capable of restoring capacity without relying directly on Western leasing companies or maintenance networks. The request to Hanoi reveals how deeply aviation sanctions are beginning to affect everyday mobility inside Russia.
The difficulty is that Vietnam’s major airlines operate primarily Airbus and Boeing aircraft. Any transfer of those planes to Russian carriers could expose Vietnamese companies to secondary sanctions because Western-made aircraft, parts and services remain subject to restrictions. Similar Russian approaches to countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East have so far produced limited results. Ethiopia reportedly rejected a comparable proposal because of the sanctions risk.
Russia’s aviation problem began after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Western lessors demanded the return of hundreds of aircraft. Moscow responded by allowing domestic airlines to re-register many of those planes inside Russia rather than return them. That decision created legal disputes over ownership and certification while also cutting much of the fleet off from internationally recognized maintenance systems. Russian airlines increasingly began cannibalizing grounded aircraft for spare parts.
The numbers now illustrate the cost of that strategy. Of 673 aircraft operated by Russia’s largest airlines, around 130 are reportedly inactive. Outside the Aeroflot group, the situation is even more severe, with close to one third of aircraft grounded. Domestic regulators have issued their own certificates for some replacement components, but those certifications are not recognized by European or U.S. aviation authorities, limiting the international usability of the fleet.
Fuel has become another pressure point. Restrictions on aviation fuel supplies have been introduced at several major Russian airports after Ukrainian drone attacks disrupted refinery operations. Moscow is also considering new passenger surcharges to help finance the purchase and operation of domestically produced aircraft such as the MC-21 and Tu-214. Those planes are strategically important for reducing dependence on Western manufacturers, but they remain more expensive to operate and require significant state support.
Vietnam therefore represents more than a possible supplier of aircraft. It is a test of whether Russia can build alternative aviation networks outside the Western regulatory and industrial system. If Hanoi accepts, Moscow would gain temporary operational relief. If it refuses, the episode would demonstrate the reach of secondary sanctions and the difficulty of isolating commercial aviation from global certification, insurance and maintenance standards.
Russia can replace routes, regulations and suppliers. Replacing an entire aviation ecosystem is far more difficult.
Sanctions become strategic when infrastructure begins to age.