Phoenix 24
The Kremlin is monetizing entry under stress.
Moscow, May 2026. Russia is considering a sharp increase in state migration fees for foreign citizens, with charges expected to rise between five and twelve times depending on the procedure. The proposal, set for review by the State Duma, would raise costs for residence permits, temporary residence permits and citizenship processing. Authorities present the measure as an effort to restore order in migration policy while generating additional budget revenue.
The planned increases are significant. A residence permit would cost up to 30,000 rubles, while Russian citizenship processing would rise to 50,000 rubles. Fees for companies hiring foreign specialists would also increase, turning migration administration into a fiscal instrument at a moment when the Russian state is searching for new sources of income.
The political context is harder to ignore. Russia’s foreign population has fallen by around 700,000 in one year, dropping from 6.8 million to 6.1 million, while residence and citizenship applications have also declined. The collapse in naturalization requests is especially revealing: Russian passports issued to immigrants fell from 735,000 in 2021 to 152,000 in 2025.
This is not only a bureaucratic adjustment. It reflects a state under demographic, labor and wartime pressure, trying to extract revenue from a shrinking pool of foreign workers while tightening control over mobility. For migrants from Central Asia, Russia remains a major labor destination, but a weaker ruble, stricter rules and declining dollar-denominated wages are reducing its appeal.
The deeper signal is structural: Moscow is turning migration into both a budgetary tool and a political filter. The policy may bring short-term revenue, but it also risks accelerating the very decline it seeks to manage. In a war economy, even paperwork becomes part of the state’s survival machinery.
Truth is structure, not noise. / La verdad es estructura, no ruido.