The method sounds improvised, but the underlying threat is increasingly serious.
Faslane, Scotland
Britain’s Royal Navy is reportedly training sailors aboard Vanguard-class nuclear submarines to use high-pressure fire hoses against small drones that penetrate other defensive layers while the vessels are docked. The unusual measure has drawn attention because these submarines carry the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, yet one of their closest-range protections against certain aerial threats may be remarkably simple.
The reported tactic is intended primarily for small FPV-style drones and other short-range systems approaching vessels at close distance. Sailors positioned on deck could direct powerful streams of water toward an incoming drone in an attempt to disrupt its flight, damage its electronics or force it away from the submarine.
The Royal Navy maintains that this is not the fleet’s only protection. Security around nuclear submarines includes physical barriers, patrols, surveillance, tracking and counter-drone capabilities. Larger or longer-range threats would be expected to trigger more sophisticated military responses, potentially involving air-defense assets rather than sailors standing on deck with hoses.
The concern centers on HM Naval Base Clyde at Faslane, northwest of Glasgow, home to Britain’s Vanguard-class ballistic-missile submarines. The geography that helps protect the base from conventional maritime threats also presents a different vulnerability. Public roads, hills and accessible terrain around the wider area can potentially reduce warning time if small drones are launched from relatively nearby positions.
That vulnerability reflects a broader change in warfare. Cheap unmanned aircraft have repeatedly demonstrated that highly expensive military platforms can be threatened by systems costing only a fraction of their value. Conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have accelerated military efforts to develop electronic warfare, directed-energy systems, jammers and specialized interceptors capable of defeating drones without exhausting costly missiles.
Water hoses may therefore appear primitive, but the concept of a low-cost final defensive layer is not inherently irrational. Militaries increasingly face an economic problem as much as a technological one: using an interceptor worth hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars against a relatively inexpensive drone is difficult to sustain at scale.
The controversy instead raises questions about whether Britain’s most sensitive military facilities possess enough layered protection before a drone reaches that final range. The British government has announced additional investment in protecting military installations, while the armed forces continue expanding their use of autonomous systems and counter-drone technologies.
The irony is difficult to ignore. The same Royal Navy is developing sophisticated autonomous platforms, testing uncrewed systems with NATO allies and operating destroyers capable of confronting missile and drone threats in contested waters. Yet at the innermost defensive perimeter of its nuclear fleet, one of the available responses may still involve pressurized water.
Modern warfare is increasingly proving that technological superiority does not eliminate the need for simple defenses when cheap machines can reach very expensive targets.