A fragile lifeline offered to prevent the last arms-control pillar from crumbling into uncertainty.
Moscow, September 2025
Vladimir Putin announced before Russia’s Security Council that he is proposing a one-year extension of the New START treaty—the last remaining nuclear arms reduction pact between Russia and the United States—set to expire next February. According to the Russian president, its expiration would endanger global stability. He stressed that Moscow will continue to respect the current limits on warheads and missiles while awaiting a reciprocal commitment from Washington.
The New START, originally signed during the era of Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, restricts each country to a maximum of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 strategic missiles and bombers. Although Russia suspended mutual inspections in 2020, citing external military pressure, it has continued to respect the ceilings established by the agreement. Putin noted that the suspension of inspections does not equal a total rupture and suggested that protocols could be reactivated if conditions allow.
The Kremlin emphasized that the extension proposal seeks to preserve at least a minimal window of dialogue with Washington, in what it describes as a dangerous escalation involving Ukraine and NATO. Moscow insisted that the United States must act with reciprocity, observing the same limits and offering clear signs that it will not use the treaty’s expiration to strengthen its military position in Europe and Asia.
Analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London warn that while the proposed extension carries symbolic value, its implementation faces serious obstacles. The absence of active inspections for several years has eroded confidence between the parties. Meanwhile, the broader geopolitical context—war in Ukraine, the rise of Chinese military capabilities, and technological rivalries—threatens to reduce the treaty to little more than a relic rather than an effective brake on the arms race.
From Washington, sources cited by U.S. media suggest the White House is approaching the Russian offer with caution. On one hand, the extension could delay a critical phase of strategic breakdown; on the other, accepting without conditions might weaken U.S. diplomatic leverage over Russia on other issues, including human rights and the war in Ukraine.
In Europe, governments express growing concern over Washington’s silence about a potential counterproposal. Paris and Berlin have emphasized that despite its shortcomings, the treaty remains one of the few institutionalized mechanisms for global nuclear control. Experts at the European Council on Foreign Relations caution that allowing it to expire without replacement could create a dangerous vacuum: difficult to quantify, but highly prone to escalation through miscalculation or unpredictable actions.
In Asia, observers in Tokyo and Seoul are following the developments closely. Japanese officials argue that any weakening of New START could push Japan to reconsider its stance of restrained militarization vis-à-vis China and North Korea. In South Korea, calls are intensifying to strengthen conventional defenses amid fears that less regulated nuclear deterrence could amplify immediate threats.
Beyond the immediate debate, the core question is whether arms control itself remains viable in the 21st century. Can a treaty more than a decade old endure without verification? Can an agreement without inspections maintain credibility? Russia seems to bet that it can, as long as Washington demonstrates genuine diplomatic will and reciprocity is not reduced to an empty phrase.
The future of New START will test whether deterrence can still be shaped by rules and trust, or whether the world is heading toward a new era of diffuse nuclear risk in which great powers act according to strength and suspicion.
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