Europe’s threat map is becoming permanent.
The Hague, April 2026. The Netherlands has placed Russia and China at the center of its national security concerns, warning that the country is facing its most intense threat environment in eight decades. The annual assessment from Dutch intelligence portrays a world where military pressure, cyber operations, espionage and economic coercion no longer operate as separate risks. They now form a continuous strategic field pressing directly against European stability.
Russia appears in the report as the most immediate military and cyber threat. Dutch authorities describe Moscow as increasingly aggressive toward Europe and preparing for a prolonged confrontation with the West. That warning carries particular weight because the Netherlands has been one of Ukraine’s most visible European supporters. In this context, support for Kyiv is not only a foreign policy position; it becomes part of the threat calculation facing Dutch institutions.
The cyber dimension sharpens that concern. Russian-linked actors have been accused of targeting Dutch officials and military personnel through messaging platforms, while military intelligence has warned that artificial intelligence is helping hostile actors accelerate and scale cyber operations. This changes the rhythm of the threat. Cyberattacks are no longer isolated intrusions; they are becoming automated instruments of pressure, surveillance and disruption.
China represents a different but equally strategic risk. Dutch intelligence identifies Beijing as the country’s most serious economic security threat, especially through covert efforts to obtain knowledge from companies, universities and research institutions. The Netherlands is not a peripheral target in this field. Its technological ecosystem, semiconductor relevance and academic infrastructure make it a valuable node in the struggle over innovation, sovereignty and industrial advantage.
The warning reflects a deeper European dilemma. Open societies depend on academic exchange, global trade and scientific collaboration, but those same channels can be exploited by authoritarian powers seeking technological leverage. When research, patents and industrial knowledge become strategic assets, espionage no longer looks like an external breach only. It can move through partnerships, investments, recruitment and institutional access.
The report also points to Iran, though with less centrality than Russia and China. Dutch authorities describe Iranian cyber activity focused on regime critics, Middle East specialists and government-linked targets. This places the Netherlands inside a wider pattern of transnational repression, where foreign states pursue opponents and sensitive communities beyond their own borders. Security, in that sense, becomes both domestic and international at once.
Another disturbing element is the growing use of criminal networks by state actors. Foreign intelligence services and hostile governments increasingly rely on intermediaries, local contacts and organized groups to conduct espionage or intimidation. This blurs the line between geopolitics and organized crime. The threat no longer arrives only through embassies, hackers or military units; it can move through informal networks already embedded inside national territory.
Internally, Dutch intelligence continues to identify jihadism as the most serious terrorist threat, with online radicalization playing a central role among younger individuals. Far-right extremism and anti-institutional movements also remain areas of concern, particularly when conspiracy beliefs turn into hostility against journalists, judges and state institutions. This means the Netherlands is not facing only external pressure. It is also managing domestic fractures that adversaries can exploit.
The strategic importance of the report lies in its cumulative diagnosis. No single threat dominates the entire picture. Instead, the Netherlands faces a convergence of risks: Russian military pressure, Chinese economic espionage, Iranian cyber activity, extremist radicalization and criminalized intelligence operations. That convergence is what makes the current environment so difficult to govern.
For Europe, the Dutch warning is not an isolated national document. It reflects the continent’s larger transition from post-Cold War confidence to permanent security management. Energy systems, digital networks, research universities, ports, courts, media and military infrastructure are now part of the same defensive architecture. The front line is no longer only territorial; it is institutional.
The Netherlands is especially exposed because of its strategic profile. It is a logistics hub, a technological actor, a NATO member, a knowledge economy and a politically open society. Those strengths also create vulnerabilities. The more connected and advanced a state becomes, the more surfaces it offers to hostile actors seeking influence, disruption or extraction.
The deeper warning is that European security has entered an era without clear pauses. Threats do not wait for declarations of war, and hostile activity rarely appears in a single dramatic event. It accumulates through data theft, influence operations, infrastructure probing, cyber intrusions, political intimidation and economic dependency. The battlefield is dispersed, slow and persistent.
The Dutch assessment therefore marks more than an intelligence update. It is a strategic signal that Europe must stop treating security as a temporary emergency and start treating it as a permanent condition of governance. Russia and China may represent different threat models, but together they reveal the same reality: power is now exercised through pressure across every layer of national life.
Detrás de cada dato, hay una intención. Detrás de cada silencio, una estructura.