Six months of disruption in Hormuz are forcing Gulf exporters to redesign energy logistics at sea.
SINGAPORE
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are using unusual ship-to-ship transfers outside the Strait of Hormuz to preserve part of their liquefied natural gas trade after six months of conflict restricted one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Ship-tracking data identified three LNG cargoes transferred between tankers during August for delivery to India and Japan.
Unlike crude oil, LNG is rarely moved between vessels because the operation requires specialized equipment, strict temperature control and carefully coordinated safety procedures. The transfers allow tankers exposed to the dangerous passage through Hormuz to hand their cargo to other ships in comparatively safer waters off Oman and the UAE. This reduces the time individual vessels remain connected to the high-risk route, although it does not eliminate the danger or restore normal export volumes.
One Qatari cargo originally loaded at the Ras Laffan terminal was transferred from the Al Rekayyat to the Tembek off the UAE’s eastern coast before arriving at India’s Dahej terminal. The Al Rekayyat had previously been struck by a projectile near Hormuz. Another Qatari shipment was transferred off Oman between the GasLog Shanghai and the GasLog Savannah. An Emirati cargo loaded at Das Island was moved from ADNOC’s Mraweh to the LNG Enugu, which continued toward Japan.
These operations demonstrate logistical adaptability, but they cannot compensate fully for the region’s declining exports. Middle Eastern LNG flows have fallen sharply since the conflict began, while Asian spot prices have climbed to approximately $23.20 per million British thermal units—more than twice their pre-conflict level. Higher transport, insurance and security costs are also spreading through electricity markets, industrial production and consumer prices.
The crisis is especially significant for Qatar because its dominant LNG infrastructure lies inside the Gulf and lacks a large alternative export corridor. The UAE has greater capacity to develop ports and transport routes on its eastern coastline, but much of its existing energy system also remains geographically tied to Hormuz. Ship-to-ship transfers therefore offer a temporary bridge, not a structural solution. Their growing use reveals how energy security now depends as much on maritime flexibility and political stability as on production capacity.
A supply chain is only as secure as its most vulnerable passage.